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Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hospital: The Fourth 
Circuit's Antitrust Analysis for Peer Review 
Actions Under the Sherman Act 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"The basic federal antitrust law, the Shennan Act, 1 was 
passed in 1890 against a background of rampant cartelization 
and monopolization of the American economy."2 Congress 
sought to correct what it thought was a market 
defect-disparity and unfair trade practices. As a consequence, 
section one of the Shennan Act prohibits concerted action that 
imposes restraint on trade.3 Section two prohibits the forma-
tion of monopolies as a result of unilateral conduct.4 
The plaintiff in Oksanen v. Page Menwrial,5 Dr. Oksanen, 
claimed that as a result of a peer review, which suspended 
then revoked his staff privileges, he was prevented from prac-
ticing medicine at Page Memorial Hospital (''Page Memorial") 
and that such constituted a violation of sections one and two of 
the Shennan Act.6 The scope of this note is limited to the alle-
gation that Page Memorial and its medical staff conspired 
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988). 
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 23 (1976). 
3. § 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, 
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall 
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby 
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on convic-
tion thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars 
if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, 
or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punish-
ments, in the discretion of the court. 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
4. § 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof, 
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corpora-
tion, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by impris-
onment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the 
discretion of the court. 
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). 
5. 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992). 
6. ld. at 702. 
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against Dr. Oksanen resulting in an unreasonable restraint of 
trade in violation of section one of the Sherman Act. 7 
This note will employ four sections to analyze the Fourth 
Circuit's position of extending the inter-enterprise immunity 
doctrine8 to hospital peer review under section one of the 
Sherman Act. Section II presents a factual summary as well as 
procedural synopsis of Oksanen. 9 In section III the Fourth 
Circuit's rationale that: 
1) During the peer review process the medical staff acts 
as the agent of Page Memorial and as such the intra-
enterprise immunity doctrine is applicable: 
2) "There are no strong antitrust concerns that would 
warrant a departure from traditional concepts of agen-
cy since the hospital and the medical staff aren't com-
petitors."10 Furthermore, "there is an overriding na-
tional need to provide incentive and protection for 
physicians engaging in effective professional peer re-
view:11 
3) The personal stake exemption does not apply since 
there was only one doctor who practiced in overlapping 
areas, and he wasn't even a member of the staff when 
these problems occurred nor did he participate in the 
peer review that suspended Dr. Oksanen: 
is analyzed and questioned. In conclusion, section IV recapitu-
lates that there is no need to extend intra-enterprise immunity 
to peer group review in a hospital backdrop. 
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
8. The actions of a single enterprise are immune from the coverage of seetion 
one of the Sherman Act. The inter-enterprise doctrine has extended this immunity 
from violation of section one of the Sherman Act to cases in the business setting 
where the alleged coconspirators have an agent/principal relationship. One such 
case exists when a subsidiary and a parent company aet together to further their 
business concerns. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984). 
9. 945 F.2d at 696. 
10. !d. at 703 (citation omitted). 
11. !d. at 704, n.2 (citation omitted). 
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II. FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL SYNOPSIS 
A. Factual Summary 
605 
In 1978, Dr. Oksanen launched his career as a family prac-
titioner in Luray, 12 Virginia. 13 He received full medical staff 
privileges at Page Memorial14 in 1979. 15 
A short time after Dr. Oksanen received his medical staff 
privileges, the hospital began to receive complaints about his 
conduct. 16 These complaints continued to increase and it was 
often reported that Dr. Oksanen addressed or referred to hospi-
tal employees and other professionals with profanity. 17 
Dr. Oksanen often displayed his unprofessional attitude 
through public and demeaning outbursts. These had a disrupt-
ing effect on the operation of the hospital. 18 For example, one 
member of the Page Memorial staff was reported to have said, 
"he has a volatile personality and you just don't know when it's 
going to erupt."19 
Relations between Dr. Oksanen and other members of the 
medical and hospital staffs deteriorated over time. In May 
12. Luray is located in Page County, Virginia and is comprised of 18,000 
residents. !d. at 699. 
13. !d. 
14. Page Memorial Hospital (Page Memorial), a fifty-four bed institution, is the 
only hospital in Page County. The organizational structure of Page Memorial, 
which is similar to other hospitals, can be broken down into three sub-groups: 
•Board of Trustees (Board) - The Board operates as the hospital's governing 
body, and exercises final decision making authority on issues affecting Page 
Memorial. 
•Hospital Administrator - John S. Berry (Administrator Berry) is in charge of 
day to day management of Page Memorial such as the supervision of the nursing 
staff, laboratory personnel, and service providers. 
•Medical Staff- The medical staff embodies all those physicians who have been 
granted staff privileges. The medical staff is responsible for the process of peer 
review. Peer review entails the members of the medical staff making recommenda-
tions to the Board as to whether a physician's privileges should be continued or 
revoked. !d. at 699-700. 
Page Memorial does not directly employ the medical staff. The relation between 
the two consists of the hospital providing office space, an allowance for expenses, 
and a facility where the staffed physicians may treat their patients needing 
hospital care. !d. at 700. 
15. !d. at 699. 
16. !d. at 700. For example, in October 1979, Administrator Berry received 
complaints from laboratory personnel involving Dr. Oksanen's mistreatment of 
them. 
17. !d. 
18. !d. 
19. !d. 
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1983, when Dr. Oksanen publicly reprimanded a nurse and her 
supervisor concerning the care given to one of his patients, his 
conduct had overstepped the bounds of professionalism.20 Al-
though the nurse tried to explain herself, Dr. Oksanen threw 
down his charts and left the area. 21 It was this incident that 
prompted the Hospital Administrator (Administrator Berry), in 
accordance with the hospital by-laws, to request that the medi-
cal staff investigate the incident.22 The medical staff recom-
mended that no disciplinary action be taken against Dr. 
Oksanen with regards to the nurse/Oksanen episode.23 
Later in 1983, the Board of Trustees (Board) distributed a 
letter to the entire medical staff explaining Page Memorial's 
need to seek a harmonious working environment.24 Dr. 
Oksanen stated that he found the letter demeaning and insult-
ing.25 He wrote the Board that he would cooperate when it 
had retracted its letter and a trustee had personally retrieved 
the letter from his office. 26 
As a result of Dr. Oksanen's reputation of arrogance and 
the two above-explained incidents, the Board, at its July 12 
meeting, "voted unanimously to request that the medical staff 
take corrective actions against [Dr.] Oksanen.'m The Board 
warned the medical staff that another refusal to take action 
against Dr. Oksanen, would force the Board "to evaluate more 
thoroughly [Dr. Oksanen's] hospital privileges during the annu-
al credentialing process.''28 
The medical staff subsequently revoked Dr. Oksanen's staff 
privileges and Dr. Oksanen appealed their revocation to a Joint 
Conference Committee ("Committee").29 The Committee rec-
ommended that at the very least Dr. Oksanen's privileges be 
suspended.30 
20. !d. 
21. !d. 
22. !d. 
23. !d. 
24. !d. 
25. !d. 
26. !d. 
27. !d. 
28. !d. at 701. 
29. ld. The Joint Conference Committee (Committee) was comprised of Dr. 
Ancheta, a member of the medical staff, and two members of the Board. The 
Committee heard testimony from sixteen witnesses and Dr. Oksanen. ld. 
30. !d. 
603] ANTI-TRUST AND PEER REVIEW 607 
In October 1983, Dr. Oksanen and his attorney argued 
before the Board that his privileges not be suspended.31 Irre-
spective of their arguments the Board voted nine to two, with 
Dr. Holsinger abstaining, to suspend Dr. Oksanen's medical 
staff privileges for two months, after which, his privileges 
would be reinstated on a one-year probationary basis.32 The 
Board also directed other staff members to cooperate with Dr. 
Oksanen during his probationary period.33 
Dr. Oksanen's privileges were restored and his probation-
ary period began in January 1984.34 Throughout the proba-
tionary period, both Dr. Oksanen and the medical staff traded 
accusations that the other was failing to meet the requirements 
set forth by the Board.35 In addition, the Board continued to 
receive complaints of Dr. Oksanen's disruptive behavior.36 
On May 8, 1984, the Board again requested that the medi-
cal staff take disciplinary action against Dr. Oksanen.37 This 
time the medical staff recommended that Dr. Oksanen's medi-
cal privileges at Page Memorial be permanently revoked.38 On 
June 27, 1984, before the Board had made a final determina-
tion in the disposition of Dr. Oksanen's staff privileges, he 
resigned39 from the Page Memorial medical staff.40 
:n. Id. 
~i2. !d. It should he noted that this suspension in no way affected Dr. 
Oksanen's licensure in the State of Virginia. 
:1a. !d. During Dr. Oksanen's two-month suspension he held a news conference 
in which he asked for community support in his plight against Page Memorial. 
During the news conference, he also questioned the competence of one of the 
hospital's staff surgeons and alleged that the reason he was unable to place his 
patients in the local nursing home was because Dr. Holsinger controlled the home. 
As a result, a group of supporters campaigned to elect representatives to the 
Board who would he more favorable to Dr. Oksanen-they managed to elect four 
representatives from their ticket, including a replacement for Dr. Holsinger. ld. 
~i4. !d. 
:iii. !d. 
:l6. !d. 
:17. !d. 
:i8. !d. 
39. !d. at 702. 
40. Irl. at 702. After resigning Dr. Oksanen continued to receive staff priv-
ileges from nearby Shenandoah Memorial Hospital. In September 1984, the Virgin-
ia Board of Medicine initiated disciplinary proceedings against Dr. Oksanen which 
culminated in a consent order reprimanding Dr. Oksanen for practicing medicine 
without a valid Virginia license and for negligence in the death of a patient. !d. 
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B. Procedural Synopsis 
In 1988, Dr. Oksanen brought suit against Page Memorial 
and its medical staff in federal district court for violations of 
the Sherman Antitrust ActY The United States District 
Court for the Western District of Virginia, held in summary 
judgement, that there were no violations of the Sherman Act 
and that as a matter of law the defendants may have lacked 
the capacity to conspire.42 Dr. Oksanen appealed to the 
Fourth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals.43 A pan-
el of this circuit concluded that the defendants did indeed have 
the capacity to engage in antitrust conspiracy.44 The Fourth 
Circuit reversed the grant for summary judgement and held 
that Dr. Oksanen was not given an adequate opportunity to 
take and receive discovery.45 
Upon rehearing en bane, the Fourth Circuit confirmed the 
district court's hypothesis that the defendants may not have 
the capacity to conspire.46 The basis for the Fourth Circuit's 
decision was the intra-enterprise doctrine, they felt it should be 
extended to hospital peer review.47 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
As stated earlier, the scope of this note is confined to 
Oksanen's allegation that Page Memorial and/or its medical 
staff violated section one of the Sherman Act.48 Dr. Oksanen 
asserted that the revocation of his staff privileges and other 
conduct by the defendants constituted a violation of section one 
of the Sherman Act.49 The following two subsections analyze 
and criticize the court's rationale in holding that Page Memori-
al and the medical staff lacked the capacity to conspire in viola-
tion of section one of the Sherman Act. 50 
41. !d. 
42. ld. 
43. Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 913 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1990). 
44. !d. at 77. 
45. !d. at 73. 
46. Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 708 (4th Cir. 1991) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992). 
47. !d. 
48. !d. 
49. !d. 
50. !d. 
603] ANTI-TRUST AND PEER REVIEW 609 
A. Conspiracy Under Section One of the Sherman Act 
Application of section one of the Sherman Act is extended 
only to those situations where there is evidence of a concerted 
action.51 The Oksanen court interprets this to require "evi-
dence of a relation between two legally distinct persons or enti-
ties."52 "It is not enough that a single firm appears to 'restrain 
trade' unreasonably, for even a vigorous competitor may leave 
that impression."53 Section one of the Sherman Act is intend-
ed to reach only unreasonable restraints on trade54 precipitat-
ed by contract, combination or conspiracy55 between distinct 
and separate entities.56 
Therefore, to establish a violation of section one of the 
Sherman Act, plaintiff must first show that commerce has 
some how been affected.57 This is the jurisdictional key that 
gets the case in federal court. 58 Next, the plaintiff needs to 
show the "existence of an agreement in the form of a contract, 
combination or a conspiracy that imposes an unreasonable 
restraint on trade."59 Dr. Oksanen contended that during the 
peer review process, the hospital and the medical staff con-
spired to keep him from practicing at Page Memorial. 60 
51. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). The 
prima facie elements in a section one claim are: 
1) Existence of a contract, combination or conspiracy 
2) affecting interstate commerce 
3) which imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade. 
White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 
1983). 
52. Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 702 (4th Cir. 1991) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 973 (1992). 
53. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984). 
54. White & White, 723 F.2d at 504. 
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
56. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (demonstrating an 
example of what constitutes "separate entities"). 
57. White & White, 723 F.2d at 504. 
58. ld. "Demonstrating that an alleged agreement would affect interstate com-
merce [or commerce between the states and foreign nations] has been treated as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a section one claim that must be satisfied 
before the other two elements of such a claim can be addressed. See Summit 
Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, _ U.S. _, 111 S. Ct. 1842, 114 L.Ed.2d. 366, 59 U.S.L.W. 
(1991)." 945 F.2d at 702 (citing, White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply 
Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
59. 945 F.2d at 702 (citing, White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply 
Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 504 (6th Cir. 1983)). 
60. ld. 
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Dr. Oksanen claimed that the jurisdictional element is met 
because among other things, "the hospital and its staff pur-
chase supplies and receive insurance payments from out-of-
state sources and that they treat non-Virginia residents."61 
Therefore their actions have an effect on commerce. 62 
Dr. Oksanen alleged that the peer review process constitut-
ed a conspiracy that imposed an unreasonable restraint on 
trade.63 First, "it was used as a vehicle to punish him for 
sending patients to other area hospitals . . . ."64 Second, "[Dr.] 
Oksanen argued that the peer review serves a gatekeeping 
function so that an unfavorable review from Page Memorial 
could affect his ability to obtain staff privileges at other hospi-
tals."65 
B. The Fourth Circuit's Analysis of Oksanen 
Dr. Oksanen maintains that the medical staff and the 
hospital are distinct legal entities.66 The Fourth Circuit, in 
implementing the distinct entity test to this fact scenario, stat-
ed that the relationship between Page Memorial and the medi-
cal staff-as far as the peer review process-is one of principal 
and agent.67 The court then asserted that this relationship 
was similar to the relationship covered by the umbrella of in-
tra-corporate immunity as set forth in Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp.: 
[O]fficers or employees of the same firm do not provide the 
plurality of actors imperative for a § 1 conspiracy .... The 
distinction between unilateral and concerted conduct is neces-
sary for the proper understanding of the terms "contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy" in § 1. Nothing in the literal 
meaning of those terms excludes coordinate conduct among 
officers or employees of the same company. 68 
Therefore the hospital and the medical staff are to be consid-
ered one indistinct entity when performing a peer review.69 
61. !d. 
62. !d. 
63. !d. 
64. !d. 
65. !d. 
66. Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 702-03 (4th Cir. 1991). 
67. !d. at 703. 
68. 467 U.S. at 769. 
69. 945 F.2d at 703. 
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Copperweld held that agreements between a parent compa-
ny and a wholly owned subsidiary were not concerted actions 
as defined in section one because the parent and the subsidiary 
always have a unity of interests and hence their agreements 
can not be considered a sudden joining of independent inter-
ests.70 The Fourth Circuit feels that a "similar unity of inter-
est is present in the relationship between the hospital and its 
staff', 71 and consequently held that Copperweld's functional 
approach required the court to look beyond form and into the 
substance of the relationship.72 
Although the Fourth Circuit concluded that technically the 
hospital staff and the medical staff are two distinct legal enti-
ties, they held that when acting in the peer review process they 
are in substance acting as one indistinct entity with a unity of 
interest-increasing the quality of patient care-and that their 
actions do not implicate the concerns of section one of the 
Sherman Act. 73 
Dr. Oksanen argues, that even if Page Memorial and the 
medical staff comprise the same enterprise, the intra-enterprise 
immunity doctrine is inapplicable because some of the doctors 
had an independent stake in the outcome of the peer evalua-
tion. 74 The court narrowly reads the personal stake exception 
to extend only so far as the rationale underlying Greenville 
Pub. Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc. 75 In Greenville, the defendant 
company's president would directly benefit from the alleged 
conspiracy, but in Oksanen, the only doctor whose practice 
70. 467 U.S. at 752. Further the Supreme Court has expressed its dislike of 
rules such as the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, that penalize coordinate 
conduct "simply because a corporation delegated certain responsibilities to autono-
mous units might well discourage corporations from creating divisions with their 
presumed benefits." ld. at 771. 
71. 945 F.2d at 7ml. Both Page Memorial and the medical staff seek to 
upgrade the quality of patient care. ld. 
72. ld. "Copperweld in fact criticized the notion that a corporation can conspire 
with itself because this 'looks to the form of an enterprise's structure and ignores 
the reality.'" ld. (citation omitted). 
73. 945 F.2d at 704. 
74. ld. at 705. "This circuit has observed that an exception to the general rule 
that a corporation cannot conspire with its officers or agents 'may be justified 
when the officer has an independent personal stake in achieving the corporation's 
illegal objective.'" ld. (citing Greenville Pub. Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 
391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974)). 
75. 496 F.2d :191 (4th Cir. 1974). Here the court held that the president of the 
defendant company was capable of conspiring with said company if he held an 
interest in another company that competed with the plaintiff firm and that would 
benefit if the plaintiff were forced out of the market. ld. at 400. 
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might have directly benefited from Dr. Oksanen's expulsion 
was Dr. Dale, and he wasn't admitted to the hospital until 
August 1983 and he did not take part in the peer review lead-
ing to Dr. Oksanen's suspension.76 
The summation of the court's rationale for holding that 
Page Memorial and the medical staff are incapable of conspir-
ing during the peer review can be stated as follows: 
1) During the peer review process the medical staff acts 
as the agent of Page Memorial and as such the intra-
enterprise immunity doctrine is applicable. 
2) "There are no strong antitrust concerns that would 
warrant a departure from traditional concepts of agen-
cy since the hospital and the medical staff aren't com-
petitors.'>?? Furthermore, "there is an overriding na-
tional need to provide incentive and protection for 
physicians engaging in effective professional peer re-
view.78 
3) The personal stake exemption does not apply since 
there was only one doctor who practiced in overlapping 
areas, and he wasn't even a member of the staff when 
these problems occurred nor did he participate in the 
peer review that suspended Dr. Oksanen. 
C. Conflict Among the Other Circuit Courts 
Whether a hospital and its medical staff have the capacity 
to conspire is at controversy among the different circuit courts. 
There are those circuits that hold that a hospital and its medi-
cal staff lack the capacity to conspire when conducting a peer 
review, extending some form of the intra-enterprise immunity 
doctrine to the peer review process, thereby insulating the hos-
76. 945 F.2d at 70fi. 
!d. 
In any event, the more important aspect of Greenville for the purpose of 
peer review is the degree of control the officer or agent with the inde-
pendent interest exercised over the defendant firm's decisionmaking pro-
cess. If the officer cannot cause a restraint to be imposed and his firm 
would have taken the action anyway, then the independent interest is 
largely irrelevant to antitrust analysis. 
77. ld. at 703 (citation omitted). 
78. !d. at 704 n.2 (citation omitted). 
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pi tal and its medical staff from claims under section one of the 
Sherman Act. 79 
In Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, Nurse Midwifery 
Associates brought an action against the hospital, its doctors 
and a mutual insurer to recover for conspiracy in unreasonable 
restraint of trade where the midwives were denied staff privi-
leges at hospitals.80 The Sixth Circuit stated that to establish 
a violation of section one of the Sherman Act the plaintiffs 
must establish that the defendants combined or conspired with 
the intent to unreasonably restrain trade.81 A section one 
claim cannot be established by unilateral conduct.82 The court 
held that "[t]he [intra-enterprise] doctrine prevents a finding of 
a conspiracy between a hospital and medical staff but in cer-
tain situations does not preclude a conspiracy among individual 
members of a medical staff."83 
In so holding, the Sixth Circuit found that a hospital and 
its staff were analogous to a corporation and it officers or em-
ployees.84 Like a corporation where a relationship of principal 
and agent exist, a medical staff when acting as the staff of the 
hospital is acting as a quasi-agent and therefore is incapable of 
conspiring with the hospital.85 
In Nanavanti v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hasp., Dr. 
N anavanti, a board certified cardiologist, claimed that the hos-
pital and the executive committee conspired against him in 
79. See Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990), 
amended, 927 F.2d 904, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); Nanavanti v. Burdette 
Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 857 F.2d 96 (8rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 
(1989). 
80. 918 F.2d at 60fi. 
81. !d. at 611 (citing Smith v. Northern Mich. Hosps., 708 F.2d 942, 949 (6th 
Cir. 19R8)). 
82. !d. (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 
768 (1984)). 
83. !d. at 614. Furthermore, the court stated that: 
an agreement between officers or employees of the same firm does not 
ordinarily constitute a section 1 conspiracy, because officers of a single 
firm are not separate economic actors pursuing separate economic inter-
ests, so agreements among them do not suddenly bring together economic 
power that was previously pursuing divergent goals. Coordination within 
a firm is as likely to result from an effort to compete as from an effort 
to stifle competition. In the marketplace, such coordination may be neces-
sary if a business enterprise is to compete effectively .... 
!d. at 612 (citation omitted). 
84. !d. at 614. 
85. !d. 
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violation of section one of the Sherman Act.86 Dr. Nanavanti 
alleged that the hospital and the executive committee had 
sought to "boycott Nanavanti's services in two ways: first, they 
allegedly conspired to revoke his hospital staff privileges; and 
second, they allegedly discourage doctors from referring cardio-
logical patients to N anavanti."87 
The Third Circuit, citing Weiss v. York Hosp. ,88 stated 
that a hospital could not conspire as an entity with its medical 
staff on the grounds that the medical staff operates as an agent 
for the hospital as would an officer of a corporation and has "no 
interest in competition with the hospital."89 Therefore Tomlin 
Memorial Hospital was not capable of conspiring with the exec-
utive committee.90 
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, reasoned that 
intra-enterprise immunity constitutes a necessary doctrine in 
the world of business.91 Without such a doctrine, every action 
by an agent in the business world theoretically violates section 
one of the Sherman Act. 92 
The rule for corporations [(intra-enterprise immunity)] is 
based on considerations unique to the corporate context. The-
oretically, a "conspiracy" involving a corporation and one of 
its agents would occur every time an agent performed some 
act in the course of his agency, for such an act would be 
deemed an act of the corporation. Thus, the rule that a corpo-
ration is incapable of conspiring with its agents is necessary 
to prevent the erosion of the principle that section 1 does not 
reach unilateral acts. A hospital and the member of its medi-
cal staff, in contrast, are legally separate entities, and conse-
quently no similar danger exists that what is in fact unilater-
al activity will be bootstrapped into a "conspiracy".93 
86. 8fi7 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. dented, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989). 
87. lei. at 111. 
88. 74fi F.2d 786 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S 1060 (198fi). 
89. 8fi7 F.2d at 118. 
90. ld. 
91. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819 (11th Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990) (Physician whose medical staff privileges were 
revoked brought action against the hospital, members of medical staff, and local 
medical society for violation of federal antitrust laws). • 
92. ld. 
93. lcl. at 819. 
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The Eleventh Circuit therefore held that "[t]o establish a 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must prove 
that two or more distinct entities agreed to take action against 
him."94 The court found faulty the rationale that permitted 
the extension of intra-enterprise immunity to peer review situ-
ations, and that there was no basis for ''holding that a hospital 
is legally incapable of conspiring with members of its medical 
staff."95 The Eleventh Circuit's bottom line is that the medical 
staff and the hospital are indeed capable of conspiring with one 
another. 96 
D. Criticism of the Court's Rationale 
The first area of analysis in question is the application of 
Copperweld97 to Page Memorial and its medical staff where 
Oksanen is so easily distinguished. The medical staff is not a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Page Memorial as were the facts in 
Copperweld, nor does Page Memorial exercise the same degree 
of control over the medical staff as does a parent company over 
its subsidiary. 
A subsidiary, as an entity, is always acting under the di-
rection of the parent corporation, to hold such action a violation 
of section one of the Sherman Act would effectively permit 
section one to reach unilateral conduct.98 Hospitals on the oth-
er hand do not exercise the absolute control over their medical 
staffs as would a parent company over its subsidiary. Although 
hospitals and their staffs may share a common interest it 
should not be assumed that they have complete congruency of 
interest and are acting as a single entity. A hospital merely 
provides an environment where the doctors as independent 
contractors can apply their trade. This type of arrangement is a 
symbiotic relationship between distinct individuals, not an 
agency relationship. 
The Board of Directors of a subsidiary are fiduciaries to 
the parent company and are under an obligation to maximize 
shareholder value. The medical staff is under no obligation to 
94. !d. at 81R. 
95. !d. at 819. 
96. !d. 
97. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (19R4). 
98. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819 (11th Cir. 1990). 
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maximize revenues coming into the hospital. This is clear in 
light of the facts that doctors often hold staff privileges at more 
than one hospital. Were doctors held responsible to maximize 
the incoming rents to the hospital then that requirement would 
categorically prohibit them from seeking to hold staff privileges 
at other hospitals. 
Nor are doctors under any strict responsibility to effective-
ly participate in any professional peer review. Sure, they may 
be required to go through the motions of participation, but they 
can not be forced to act in any certain way. Furthermore, they 
receive no renumerations for their participation and are not 
authorized to act as agents. 
Considering the differences between the fact in Oksanen 
and Copperweld and the distinct differences in the rela-
tionships between the two sets of alleged conspirators, there is 
reason to believe that perhaps the doctrine of intra-enterprise 
immunity should not have been extended to Page Memorial 
and its medical staff. 
Secondly, even if the intra-enterprise doctrine should be 
extended in this case, the private interest exception could also, 
in all fairness, be extended in Oksanen. It is true that Dr. 
Oksanen's practice only overlapped one of the physician's on 
the medical staff, and that that physician arrived after the 
problems began and did not participate in the proceeding 
wherein Dr. Oksanen was suspended. However, there is evi-
dence that other members of the medical staff also had a pri-
vate interest which they may have wished to protect by sus-
pending Dr. Oksanen. 
Doctors Horng and Ancheta were surgeons at the hospital 
who may have had private interests in seeing Dr. Oksanen lose 
his medial staff privileges. For instance, Dr. Oksanen ques-
tioned whether or not Drs. Horng and Ancheta knew the limi-
tations of their expertise, and as a result Dr. Oksanen began 
sending his patients to other hospitals for surgery. 99 The lost 
revenue of these surgeons could easily provide for motive to es-
tablish a personal stake. 
Lastly, the court could just as easily have ended with the 
same result, that there was no section one violation, by apply-
ing the traditional two prong test as set forth in section one of 
the Sherman Act. 100 Namely, was there a contract, combina-
99. 945 F.2d at 700. 
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Fourth Circuit's rationale may have been moti-
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tion or conspiracy between the medical staff and Page Memori-
al that imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade. 
There is clearly no objection to the first prong that the 
defendants acted in concert, that may be assumed to be a given 
in this case. Page Memorial and the medical staff did act in 
concert to prevent Dr. Oksanen from practicing at Page Memo-
rial. There is however no evidence that the concerted action 
imposed an unreasonable restraint on trade. Dr. Oksanen was 
already a staff member of another hospital that competed with 
Page Memorial. They did not unreasonably restrict Dr. 
Oksanen's ability to practice medicine in the Page County area. 
It would have been unreasonable if Page Memorial had gotten 
together with the other hospitals that Dr. Oksanen worked at 
and jointly decided to black-ball him from practice. Here how-
ever, Page Memorial merely made a business decision that Dr. 
Oksanen was not the type of doctor that enhanced the medical 
staff and that the hospital would be better off without him. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The court's rationale in the paragraphs above the exten-
sion of the intra-enterprise immunity doctrine to peer review 
evaluations should be reexamined for the reasons stated above, 
namely: 
• The relationship between a hospital and a medical staff are 
very different from the relationship between a parent com-
pany and its officers of subsidiaries. 
• The same result could have been reached had the Fourth 
Circuit simply employed the standard two prong test, as 
there was no evidence of an unreasonable restraint of 
trade. 
Therefore, the position of this Note differs from those circuits 
that extend intra-enterprise immunity to hospitals and their 
medical staffs, and sides with the Eleventh Circuit which held 
that "[t]he rule for corporations [(intra-enterprise)] is based on 
considerations unique to the corporate context .... A hospital 
vated by the public policy concern of protecting evaluating doctors in the interest 
of public safety. Were these doctors found to have conspired against Dr. Oksanen 
the possible dampening effect on future peer group review could endanger the 
patients of incompetent doctors. 
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and the members of its medical staff . . . are legally separate 
entities, and consequently no similar danger exists that what is 
in fact unilateral activity will be bootstrapped into a 
'conspiracy ."'101 
Christopher Laurent 
101. Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819 (11th Cir. 1990). 
